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STUDENT NOTES
INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE-EFFECT OF BATTERY
BY DECEASED IN REDUCING OR EXCUSING THE OFFENSE
A homicide intentionally perpetrated without legal justification
or excuse is ordinarily murder, unless it appears that the slaying
was done in heat of passion engendered by an .adequate provoca-
tion in the absence of malice conceived beforehand.' If it is evi-
dent that the killing was done in heat of passion aroused by ade-
quate provocation, the homicide is no more than voluntary man-
slaughter.2 It is suggested that the law mitigates the offense under
such circumstances in recognition of human frailty' and in a spirit
of compromise. The matter may be explained from a technical
viewpoint in terms of malice, a requisite of murder. It is said that
heat of passion and malice are contradictory states of mind inca-
pable of existing together with respect to the same act, so that the
presence of passion necessitates the absence of malice.' Consequent-
ly, homicide committed in heat of passion cannot be murder.
Although the law takes into account the fact that men are apt
to act rashly when impassioned, it recognizes no passion which is
not aroused by "adequate" provocation.' Generally a provocation is
adequate if, under the circumstances, it could be expected to excite
the passions of a reasonable man beyond control, obscure his
reason, and render his mind incapable of cool reflection.! The test
is for the most part objective, the reaction of the ordinary reason-
-able man rather than that of the individual being selected as the
criterion. Assault and battery is one of the few general types of
provocation which, as a matter of law, are deemed capable in cer-
tain instances of satisfying the requirement of adequacy as meas-
ured by this objective standard.'
Whereas it is true that a battery which incites intentional
homicide may operate to reduce crimilal responsibility under the
rules of provocation and heat of passion, it may also excuse the
homicide entirely, serving as a basis of self-defense. It is the pur-
pose of the writer to consider the legal sufficiency of batteries of
various grades to operate either as a basis of adequate provocation
(mitigation) or of self-defense (excuse), as the case may be. Con-
sequently, a cursory examination of the relationship of provocation
and self-defense, as they affect homicides committed in response
to batteries in general, will perhaps prove helpful.
'2 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIMsE (1946) sec. 461.
'State v. Rennison et al., 306 Mo. 473, 267 S.W 850 (1924). Scott
v State, 49 Tex. Crm. R. 386, 93 S.W 112 (1906).
'See State v. Ferguson, 2 Hill 282, 284 (S.C. 1835)
'McHargue v Commonwealth, 231 Ky 82, 21 S.W 2d 115
(1929).
'Ballard v Commonwealth, 156 Va. 980, 159 S.E. 222 (1931).
'State v. Borders, 199 S.W 180 (Mo. 1917).
'State v. Nevares, 36 N.M. 41, 7 P 2d 933 (1932).
'STEPHEN, DiGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1947) 223, 224.
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Self-defense is a privilege based upon necessity which enables
a man to protect himself with force and-to kill intentionally, if ap-
parently necessary to protect his life or prevent great bodily
harm.' A homicide committed under this privilege is excusable, but
it must appear that the slayer acted upon a reasonable belief that
the peril to him was real and imminent,"6 and that he used no more
force than was reasonably necessary to repel the attack. In many
jurisdictions he is required to retreat if a reasonable avenue of
escape is open, and provided retreat will not increase his peril."'
Where this rule prevails, it is incumbent upon the slayer to show
that he could not have reasonably retreated if the homicide is to
be excusable."
Because self-defense is an absolute bar to criminal responsibility,
it behooves a slayer to rest his case upon that ground when possible.
As a practical matter, therefore, provocation and passion assume
great importance only where, for some reason, self-defense cannot
or may not be successfully invoked. This will be the case if the slayer
kills after all imminent danger to him has passed, as when his at-
tacker has been rendered harmless,'3 or has abandoned the en-
counter, 4 or if he used more force than was reasonably necessary for
his defense.'" Failure to retreat may, of course, have like effect, '
leaving the slayer to depend solely on provocation and heat of pas-
sion as a partial defense. Often juries must consider both self-
defense and provocation, examining the facts found in the particular
case to determine which, if either, is applicable.
It will now be seen how these principles apply to wilful hon-
cide committed in response to batteries involving several degrees of
physical force. For purposes of the present discussion batteries may
be classified as follows: (1) batteries calculated to produce death or
great bodily injury (2) batteries calculated to produce moderate
physical injury (3) batteries calculated to produce slight physical
effect.
Homicides in response to batteries calculated to produce death
or great bodily injury will generally be disposed of under the privi-
lege of self-defense. No serious problem as to the reasonableness of
the force employed by the slayer should ordinarily arise, as one is
privileged to kill in order to protect himself from imminent peril of
death or great bodily harm.'" Neither should failure to withdraw
ordinarily deprive the slayer of his privilege to defend himself by
taking life, for it is held that where a deadly weapon is employed in
'Waldon v State, 16 Okla. Crnm. R. 402, 183 Pac. 637 (1919).
"Rice v. State, 20 Ala. App. 102, 101 So. 82 (1924).
" Ibid. Cf. Myers v State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N.E. 547 (1922)
"'Oldacre v State, 196 Ala. 690, 72 So. 303 (1916).
"People v McCurdy, 140 Cal. App. 499, 35 P 2d 569 (1934).
"Williams v. State, 26 Ala. App. 529, 163 So. 668 (1935).
"Matthews v State, 22 Ala. App. 366, 115 So. 763 (1928).
"1 State v Marish, 198 Iowa 602, 200 N.W 5 (1924).
'"Rice v State, 20 Ala. App. 102, 101 So. 82 (1924).
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a felonious attack there is no duty to retreat. 8 In at least one class
of cases, however, the law of provocation is highly important to a
defendant who has killed in response to this type of battery. If he
kills after the immediate peril has passed, the right to self-defense is
forfeited, and he may therefore be compelled to seek mitigation of his
offense, relying only upon heat of passion and provocation. Ilustra-
tive is the case of Scott v. State'" wherein the deceased struck the
defendant on the head with a pistol butt, injuring hn seriously,
and so angering him, that he left to obtain his gun, returned, and
killed his attacker. Although the slayer could not claim self-defense
for the obvious reason that he was at the time of the homicide in no
immediate peril, it was said that the provocation supplied by the
blow could be sufficient to reduce the killing to manslaughter. The
same result might be expected if the defendant had subdued his
attacker and killed him immediately afterward. It is thought that
little difficulty arises in such cases as to the adequacy of provoca-
tion where the battery is one capable of causing great bodily injury.
Because the force applied to the person of the defendant is great, and
would naturally import severe shock and pain, it is not unreasonable
to suppose that heat of passion sufficient to prevent cool reflection
would be aroused thereby in an ordinary reasonable man. Although
the courts sometimes say that if a homicide is committed with a
deadly weapon the provocation must be great,' yet it is thought
batteries of great force meet this requirement.
Batteries calculated to produce moderate physical injury, as con-
trasted with those calculated to produce great injury, present a
somewhat different problem. Self-defense is less apt to be available
to the slayer. The duty to retreat is usually present whereas it is not
in the case of batteries committed with deadly weapons and felom-
ous design, and thus the slayer may be excluded from establishing
self-defense where it appears he made no reasonable attempt to
withdraw. But even if the defendant has retreated to the wall, if
he then kills with a deadly weapon, questions as to the reasonable-
ness of the force employed may be decided against him because one
may not ordinarily kill under the privilege of self-defense unless
death or great bodily injury is apparently threatened2 It would
appear, therefore, that where the homicide is in response to a bat-
tery calculated to produce less than great bodily injury, the central
issue may well be whether the defendant is guilty of murder or
manslaughter.
Batteries calculated to produce moderate physical injury may
consist of blows inflicted with fists, heavy.sticks, or with any other
objects causing considerable impact and pain, but of insufficient
force to cause death or great bodily harm. These will suffice to se-
SHays v. State, 225 Ala. 666, 145 So. 134 (1932)
,949 Tex. Crim. R. 386, 93 S.W 112 (1906).
'See State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 125, 130 (1868).
-" Amerson v. State, 26 Ga. App. 68, 105 S.E. 378 (1920)
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cure for the defendant an instruction on manslaughter, but the find-
ing of the jury should depend upon the outcome of an application of
the objective test to the facts of the particular case. The importance
of the circumstances extrinsic to the actual battery, but present at the
time, cannot be ignored as factors influencing the jury's decision on
the adequacy of provocation. It is not alone the force of the blow
which should be considered, but the effect which a battery of such
force might have been expected to produce in the mind of a reason-
able man under conditions present in the particular case. Angry
gestures and obscene epithets directed by the deceased toward the
slayer, although insufficient provocation in themselves, may when
considered in conjunction with the accompanying battery, add sub-
stantially to the provocative effect.
Remaining to be considered are those batteries calculated to
produce slight physical effect. Homicide committed in response to
such trivial bodily contacts will not be excused on the ground of
self-defense, for neither death nor great bodily injury imperils the
slayer, and the use of deadly force with the intention to kill would
appear clearly unreasonable and excessive. The defendant, there-
fore, may desire to rely heavily upon provocation and heat of pas-
sion as the only alternative to a probable conviction of murder.
Whether on this ground the slayer will be successful in obtaining
mitigation of his offense is in a particular case problematical. It has
been said by a noted writer that an assault and battery inflicting
insult alone is sufficient,' and a modem case has pronounced as
dictum that the harmless jostling of a person on a highway, or a
mere tweaking of the nose will have like effect. '
It may be true, as a practical matter, that in a particular case
a trivial battery may constitute adequate provocation, but this is not
thought to depend upon a rule of law to the effect that any battery,
no matter how slight, is adequate. It is rather the outcome of the fact
that where any degree of physical impact appears in the evidence
the court may feel obligated to give an instruction on manslaughter,
thereby allowing the jury to consider the possibility that adequate
provocation and aroused passion incited the homicide. Although the
court may charge that a trivial or slight battery is not sufficient to
constitute such provocation as the law recognizes,' thus taking a
stand on the law as an abstract proposition, the jury in applying the
facts to the law have opportunity to determine for themselves
whether the physical contact taken together with all the other cir-
cumstances in the case should be found sufficient provocation. Upon
this determination the fate of the defendant will rest. One court has
expressed its view of this matter as follows:
I-Williams v Commonwealth, 80 Ky 313 (1882).
STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1947) 223, 224.
' State v. Bongard, 330 Mo. 805, -, 51 S.W 84, 89 (1932)
'United States v. Edmonds, 63 F Supp. 968 (1946).
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"It is doubtless, in one sense, the province of the
Court to define what, in law, will constitute a reason-
able or adequate provocation, but not, I think, m or-
dinary cases, to determine whether the provocation
proved in the particular case is sufficient or reasonable.
This is essentially a question of fact, and to be .decided
with reference to the peculiar facts of each particular
case. As a general rule, the Court, after informing the
jury to what extent the passions must be aroused
to render the homcide manslaughter, should inform
them that the provocation must be one, the tendency
of which would be to produce such a degree of excite-
ment and disturbance in the minds of ordinary men
I'm
Thus it appears, under present law, that the question of whether
there is provocation in a case disclosing some degree of physical im-
pact is to a great extent one for the jury who, in the exercise of their
judgment, might find a mere trivial battery an adequate provoca-
tion in a particular case.
It may be contended that where the evidence conclusively dis-
closes that the battery was one producing no more than slight phys-
ical effect, the courts should exclude consideration of a verdict of
manslaughter from the jury, directing that the defendant be found
guilty of murder or acquitted. Words alone, no matter what provoc-
ative effect they may have on a slayer in a particular case, do not
justify a manslaughter instruction.2" It is thought the application of
a similar rule to trivial batteries would work like hardship in that
several remedies are available to one unlawfully subjected to a slight
battery. All force apparently necessary to repel the intrusion short of
taking life may be employed within the privilege of self-defense.
When the incident has passed the party in fault may be punished
under the criminal law for assault and battery, and resort may be
had to a tort action for damages. In view of these facts one may
argue that it is contrary to the interests of society in the preservation
of life and the maintenance of public peace, as well as an unneces-
sary concession to the depravity manifest in a minority of men, to
allow a slayer who has killed in response to slight force a clear
chance to avoid a conviction of murder. With this view the writer
is iclined to concur.
NORRIS W REIGLER
-'Maher v People, 10 Mich. 212, 221-222 (1862).
' State v. Gartrell, 171 Mo. 489, 71 S.W 1045 (1903), State v.
Spivey, 132 N.C. 989, 43 S.E. 475 (1903). -- -
L. J.-5
